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A B S T R A C T
Familiar theories of market failure have diagnosed shortcomings in the
economy, but theories of government failure argue that the state is
incapable of correcting them. More than that, many criticisms of
government implicitly or explicitly see failure as due to fundamental
shortcomings of democracy. This paper argues that democratic forms of
governments are not necessarily inefficient relative to other types of
decisionmaking, for example, authoritarian government, and that if
individuals are as rational in their actions and expectations as voters as
they are meant to be in the market, then failures attributed to democracy
lessen or disappear altogether. The paper demonstrates how more
democracy, i.e. the use of the initiative and referendum, may actually
improve the efficiency of government by giving the mass of citizens the
information and opportunity to frustrate efforts of the classe politique to
form a coalition against the voters. Empirical examples are drawn from
the experience of Switzerland.
/. The Market Fails, Politics Fails and Democracy Fails . . .
A. Market Failure
Competitive private markets do not lead to a Pareto-optimal or efficient
outcome when there exist external effects or public goods, and when
economies of scale lead to monopolistic positions of suppliers. This was
the generally accepted message of post-war economic theory. The
government (assumed to maximise social welfare) must therefore inter-
vene in order to bring about a more efficient outcome. This conclusion
was taken up by policy-makers on the micro-level (e.g. by nationalising
enterprises or undertaking structural policies) and on the macro-level
(by Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy).
*I am grateful for helpful comments to Iris Bohnet, Reiner Eichenberger and Angel Serna.
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21 o Bruno S. Frey
The view dominated the economic scene into the seventies, and it still
exists today. Not surprisingly, many politicians cling to this invitation to
enlarge the government's activities, but relevant parts of economic
theory also maintain this view. For instance, in neoclassical public econ-
omics taxes and public prices are determined under the assumption that
government maximises social welfare.
B. Government Failure
The market failure orthodoxy was dramatically affected by the advent of
Modern Political Economy (including Public Choice, New Institutional-
ism, Property Rights and Transaction Costs Analysis) where it is
assumed throughout that the government is an endogenous actor within
the politico-economic system (for surveys see e.g. Mueller 1989; Eggerts-
son 1990; Frey 1983). The properties of political decision-making
systems are carefully analyzed.
Scholars attached most importance to the 'General Impossibility
Theorem' (Arrow 1951, preceded by Condorcet 1795), which stated the
fundamental result that under 'reasonable' assumptions, no policy
equilibrium among alternatives exists, provided that individual prefer-
ences are to count. The voting outcomes reveal cyclical instability and in
the case of multidimensional issues outcomes may cover the whole policy
space, including inefficient outcomes (McKelvey 1976).
Other political failures were also widely discussed. Due to the public
good problem, voters have little incentive to become informed about
politics and participate in voting; the median voter outcome resulting
from perfect competition between two parties is not in general efficient;
not all interests have the same capacity to establish political pressure
groups, and bureaucracies and rent-seeking further distort the allocation
from efficiency.
On the basis of these and other political failures, it was concluded that
government is not able to overcome market failures. Rather, under
realistic conditions, political intervention leads even further away
from efficiency. A case in point is a government's incentive to create a
business cycle (Nordhaus 1989) in order to improve its reelection
chances.
C. Government Failure is More Significant than Market Failure
The results reached by Modern Political Economy have led many
scholars to believe that market failures are less important than political
failures. This belief is further strengthened by the rediscovery of Coase's
(i960) proposition that if property rights are well defined and transac-
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
00
00
56
99
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
1:
05
:5
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation 211
tion costs are low, external effects do not prevent an efficient market
solution. In addition, the profits made by monopolistic firms are increas-
ingly seen as an indication that they produce efficiently. According to
these results, markets work well and politics works badly (Wintrobe
1987, pp. 435-6, or Wittman 1989, pp. 1395-6). Therefore government
intervention should be generally reduced or even completely done away
with, and resource allocation reserved for private markets.
D. Government Failure is Democracy Failure
The analysis of politics within Modern Political Economy invariably
deals with democracies. The theoretical finding of cyclical instability is of
interest only if individual preferences are to count, or political business
cycles are due to discontinuous elections. Political failure is therefore
interpreted to consist of fundamental shortcomings of democracy.
This conclusion is brought about by the fact that no alternative politi-
cal systems are considered. There does not exist any developed theory of
authoritarian or dictatorial governments comparable to the economic
theory of democracy. (For beginnings, see Tullock, 1987, Palda, 1992,
Wintrobe, 1990.) Democratic failures, the most recent example being
the missing consistency of politics over time (e.g. Alesina 1988) have not
yet been analyzed for the case of non-democratic governments; conse-
quently, its possible failures tend to be disregarded.
That democracies are characterised by more significant deviations
from efficiency than authoritarian governments is rarely openly said; it is
more of a presumption lurking in the background. The feeling is visible in
the irritation of many economists about the 'ineffectiveness' or the
'muddle' of decision-making in a democracy. Thus, in a recent conference
on transition from planning to the market, an economist spoke of the
'catastrophic effects on the economy of the last three elections in Poland'.
This feeling easily turns into a desire for 'orderly' solutions by a
government with much authority. Such thinking constitutes in effect a
return to the planning myth which holds that society can and should be
ordered from above by a strong government. Obviously, such thinking
does not understand democracy to be a process based on an agreed set of
rules. But democracy is not concerned with end states (see e.g. Barry
1988); solutions are not simply adopted but developed. In the course
of the democratic process, information is produced, and preferences
are shaped in an institutionalised discourse. These are the essential
characteristics of democracy, not logical consistency or academic
elegance.
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212 Bruno S. Frey
II. A Reevaluation of 'Failures'
A. The Need for a Comparative Approach
The failures identified in the economics literature for the market and
political sphere are deviations from exogenously defined criteria of
optimality, in particular Pareto efficiency and (time) consistency, i.e.
two ideal standards. The axiomatic literature dealing with these issues
does not compare the relative efficiency of the various decision-making
mechanisms, and therefore falls prey to the charge that it pursues a
'Nirvana approach' (Demsetz 1989). The reason for this disregard of
'comparative institutionalism' which deals with real-life phenomena is
that the incentives for (young) scholars in economics strongly favour a
rigourous analysis of 'classroom-like exercises' and 'amusing little
games' (Kolm 1988, p. 120; and more generally Leijonhuvfud 1973; Frey
and Eichenberger 1992).
Consider the cycling problem when individual preferences are aggre-
gated in a democracy. Many hundreds of papers have been written on
this topic (a field of social choice has developed); on the other hand, the
massive discontinuities or cycles produced by authoritarian or dic-
tatorial governments have received little or no attention in the econ-
omics literature. In fact, there exist major cycles in authoritarian
systems. Non-democratic governments depend on the support of various
groups. They must take care not to rely on one only because its members
would then be able to extract a large share of the rents from the govern-
ment, or would simply take power themselves. An authoritarian leader is
therefore rational to change his main support basis from time to time,
say from the military to the urban masses, then to bureaucracy and to
the party, and then back to the military (for the case of Hitler see e.g.
Breton and Wintrobe 1986; another good example is Franco). While
such shifts in power bases may not be easy to formalise, they produce
strong time inconsistencies in policy measures. They are likely to be
much larger than in a democracy, especially as an authoritarian govern-
ment is not bound by a constitution.
B. Market and Democracy Efficiency Compared
Decisions via democratic means are no less efficient than via prices -
provided that the same basic behavioural assumptions about the
individuals are made (Wintrobe 1987, Wittman 1989). That markets are
found to work better than democracy is, to a large extent, the result of
assuming that individuals as political actors are more stupid than in the
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Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation 213
market. If a higher degree of citizens' rationality is taken to be realistic,
the failures attributed to democracy are lessened or disappear
altogether.
Cycling. A small alteration in assumption about voters' behaviour,
namely that they favour a given issue with a certain probability (instead
of fully supporting or rejecting it) leads to policy outcomes within the
efficient set (Wittmann 1989, pp. 1413-15). Individuals who are reason-
ably sensible are aware that unconstrained voting may lead to incon-
sistencies, and therefore take action to overcome such failures. The
'structure induced equilibria' favouring efficient outcomes are one
instance of what might be called superrationality. Individuals are
cognitively able to see that the way they act does not lead to rational
results and they are rational enough to improve on it. Another case is
weakness of will or akrasia, where people act irrationally in the sense that
they behave in a way not desired by themselves (e.g. they smoke, drink
or eat too much), but they are rational enough to be aware that they
behave in a non-desired way and take action against this weakness by
self-commitment (Sen 1979; Schelling 1980; Hirschman 1982; Elster
1986; Maital 1986; Frey and Eichenberger 1989). Possibilities are stop-
ping rules (so that defeated proposals may not reappear), agenda set-
ting, voting on one dimensional issue at a time (so that Black's (1958)
single-peakedness conditions are more likely to hold), and logrolling (see
Mueller 1989, pp. 89-95). Indeed, democratic voting is in reality charac-
terised by much stability (Tullock 1981; Shepsle and Weingast 1981),
and it has also been shown by experiments that such political institu-
tions tend to lead to efficient outcomes (Fiorina and Plott 1978).
Information. Citizens are better informed than has been previously
assumed if one takes into account the purpose at hand. It is rational to
be less informed about public policy than about a private good one
intends to consume, but party brand names and candidate reputations
help to make consistent and reasoned decisions. Individuals do not have
to know the production process; they can rely on the fact that the
politicians' need for reelection induces them to propose and undertake
policies that do not deviate systematically from efficiency. To fool the
voters constantly is impossible, provided that there is a competitive
struggle for citizens' votes, which is indeed a well-taken definition of
democracy (Schumpeter 1942; Downs 1957).
Transaction costs. In analogy to Coase's proposition, if these costs are
not too high, contracts between politicians are able to overcome failures
in democratic markets. Transaction costs tend to be low as politicians
constantly interact with each other, and the tradition of compromise is
well developed.
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214 Bruno S. Frey
Pressure groups. When the amount of pressure exerted by interest
groups is a function of their utility gain or loss, then the net political
pressure leads towards efficiency (Becker 1983, 1985).
All these arguments are not to say that there are no democracy
failures. Indeed, empirical research has been able to identify many cases
in which democracy, compared to a textbook view of efficiency, produ-
ced inefficient outcomes. One example is protectionism, where well
organised groups are able to distort resource allocation at the expense of
non-organised consumers and tax payers (see e.g. Frey 1984; Magee,
Brock and Young 1989). However, the arguments point to forces which
work in the direction of efficiency for democracy; the underlying
assumptions perform the same role as under competitive market condi-
tions. The discussion thus reveals a strong similarity between market
and democracy. In both decision-making systems, individual prefer-
ences are the measuring rod for efficiency, and both are process-orien-
ted. The 'invisible hand' not only guides competitive market processes
but also competitive democratic processes. It follows that in order to
evaluate efficiency, the difference between market and democratic deci-
sion-making is of lesser importance than another dimension, namely the
extent of competitiveness.
/ / / . Competitiveness of Political Organisations
Competitive economic or political markets require free entry (and exit),
the absence of regulations which prevent the success of suppliers with
the best product (goods and politics), and the demanders being able to
choose freely. These requirements seem trivial, but in practice they are
often not fulfilled. Even institutions which have been created with the
purpose of invigourating competition often strongly violate them. A case
in point is the European Community, which, on the one hand, streng-
thens competition by reducing or eliminating national protectionism in
goods, services, capital and labour, but on the other hand introduces a
large number of homogenising regulations and laws which suppress
competition as they make it impossible for suppliers to exploit compara-
tive cost advantages.
A. Federalism
Among the institutions which serve to establish competition among
political organisations, federalism is of particular interest. It is a rather
neglected institution, though the United States, Canada, Australia, Ger-
many, Austria and Switzerland have established this type of competition
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Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation 215
between national subunits. However, even there the provinces and com-
munes are severely restricted in offering a fiscal policy mix which would
attract citizens and firms to locate within their borders. In several of the
'federalist' countries mentioned, the local governments are, for example,
not free to set their own taxes, and the central government imposes strict
regulations and interferes directly in a large number of areas.
Many highly developed and democratic countries do not know federal
competition at all, prominent examples being France, the Netherlands
and Sweden. While the European Community is still a union of
independent states, its constitution is strongly biased towards centralisa-
tion, a fact that is already visible in the strong role of the Commission
and the European administration (Eurocrats) in Brussels. The future
development does not point towards a strong role of competition
between the various political subunits in the EC. It is more likely that
the politicians in power are able to push through a barrage of homogen-
ising rules and regulations which insulate them from the demands of the
citizens and allow them to collect all kinds of rents. Once the Ecu is
established, for instance, national politicians will be freer than today to
pursue an inflationary policy on the EC level, because they have less fear
that they lose reputation and credibility, and that their currency is
devalued.
The potential offered by federalism (see Tiebout 1956 and Oates
1977) to establish a vigorous competition between governmental units
has so far not been rationally designed by any country. The principle of
'fiscal equivalence' (Oates 1977), stating that the size of the political
decision-making unit should be determined so that the spatial effects of
benefits and costs of a publicly supplied good match, seems to exist in
the United States and Switzerland, yet even there to a very limited
extent only. Each public function, say, education, police, fire protection,
or, if not privatised, refuse collection, could be allocated to a particular
political unit whose geographic extension varies according to the par-
ticular supply conditions.
Multiple functional and overlapping jurisdictions exist in the Swiss
Canton of Thurgau which, with a population of only 200,000 has several
hundreds of such political communes, each with corresponding taxes.
Not surprisingly, the cantonal government, parliament and administra-
tion are not fond of this democratic 'muddle' and make efforts to sup-
press this lower-level competition, wrongly arguing that it is 'inefficient'.
But this 'inefficiency' refers at best to administrative cost, but in particular
does not take into account the benefits by supplying more closely to the
citizens' preferences, and neglects the better adjustment to changing
circumstances of the future. The citizens are, however, not completely
free to choose which service they want to enjoy (e.g. they cannot send
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216 Bruno S. Frey
their children to have their basic education wherever they choose), but a
limited amount of competition exists as communes as a whole may
switch to other suppliers, and as citizens and firms may decide where
they locate themselves, and they may exert their voting rights in the
various communes, usually taking the form of citizens' assembly (see
Casella and Frey 1992).
B. Decision-Making
Modern Political Economy tends to assume that in a democracy there is
a competition for votes. Attention has been paid to the fact that in
representative democracies elections take place discontinuously and that
this enables politicians partly to pursue their own goals (see the
literature on political business cycles as reviewed e.g. in Schneider and
Frey 1988 and Nordhaus 1989). Taking the citizens to be the principals,
and the politicians to be the agents, it has also been studied to which
extent shirking occurs, in particular how far legislators pursue their own
ideological goals instead of following the voters' preferences (e.g. Kau
and Rubin 1979, Kalt and Zupan 1984).
What has been little considered in the literature is the fact that in
democracies the politicians may establish a coalition against the voters and
taxpayers. An extreme version is Brennan and Buchanan's (1980)
exploitative government, which maximises its own revenue. The 'ins'
are, under realistic conditions, able to erect entry barriers for contenders
and put new entrants at a disadvantage at elections and in parliament.
This can, for instance, be done by favouring the established parties when
campaign contributions are handed out (see e.g. Pommerehne and
Lafay 1983), by refusing newly elected parties the status of parliamen-
tary fractions (with all the money and privileges going with it, see e.g.
von Arnim 1988), or by instituting parliamentary rules to their
disadvantage.
However, newly entering legislators and parties soon belong to the
political establishment: even when their basic ideologies widely differ
from the longer sitting members, they quickly realise that the benefits
and costs have become quite different from the non-politicians. As
predicted by the economic model of human behaviour (Becker 1976;
Kirchgassner 1991), politicians respond to the opportunities and incen-
tives given by their position, and after a short time they no longer behave
differently from all the other 'ins'. They adjust so fully that they find it
difficult to comprehend why the 'outs' feel differently; they observe with
astonishment that the basis they come from has moved away (as they see
it), while in reality they have changed their own behaviour. The coa-
lition of politicians against the voters thus is not restricted to the politi-
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Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation 217
cians in power, but covers the whole classe politique and includes public
administrators serving the politicians.
One of the important means for the coalition of politicians to reap
benefits is its agenda setting power. As has been shown in Public Choice
(e.g. Denzau 1985), the group which can determine in which order the
propositions are voted on has an important advantage. What matters
more here is what issues are discussed by the politicians and which ones
evaded. In most parliaments, for instance, questions of politicians'
salaries, compensation for failing reelection, all sorts of pensions and
other privileges are not openly discussed or formally voted upon, or only
in a disguised way, and then by acclamation.
The politicians united in a coalition also have an interest in blocking
constitutional changes which would hurt them by giving greater voice to
the 'outs', the citizens. Most importantly, no government and parlia-
ment is willing to change voting rules which give them a reelection
advantage. One example is the majority (or plurality) voting system in
the United Kingdom which drastically benefits the politicians and large
parties sitting in parliament. If the election system was changed to
proportional voting, outsiders - especially the Liberals - would get a
much higher share of parliamentary seats. Another example refers to
Switzerland (see Blankart 1992), where in the nineteenth century the
plurality principle gave the Radical-Democratic Party an absolute
majority for over seven decades in the two houses of parliament, ena-
bling them to form a one-party executive. Efforts by outsiders to change
the constitution were regularly blocked by the government and
parliament.
The classe politique also prevents constitutional changes restricting
their discretionary power. In Switzerland, between 1848 and 1946,
parliament had the right to declare federal laws as 'urgent' [dringliche
Bundesbeschliisse), so that they did not have to be submitted to the
optional popular referendum. Not surprisingly, the politicians used this
right extensively; especially in the 1930s many laws were labelled urgent
in order not to have to share power with the 'outs'. A final example
showing the empirical relevance of politicians forming a coalition
against voters refers again to Switzerland. In 1985/86, the government
decided that the country should become a member of the United
Nations. All the politicians with very few exceptions strongly supported
this move, i.e. the parliament, all major parties, all major interest
groups, bureaucrats, diplomats and the journalists all agreed on the
desirability of UN membership. This support is not surprising as these
politicians and public officials were likely to benefit directly or at least
indirectly.
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218 Bruno S. Frey
IV. Efficiency by Popular Referenda
Four formal kinds of direct participation of the citizens in political
decision-making may be distinguished: (i) a popular meeting, such as
New England town meetings or Landsgemeinden in some Swiss cantons;
(2) obligatory popular referendums; (3) optional popular referendums
requiring a certain number of signatures; (4) popular initiatives which
force a referendum on a substantive issue. These institutions of political
decision-making enable the voters to effectively make their preferences
known to the politicians and, perhaps even more importantly, to break up
the politicians' coalition against the voters. They must be distinguished sharply
from non-binding referenda and plebiscites, which both serve the
politicians to consolidate their power vis-a-vis the citizens (cf. Butler and
Ranney 1978.
The initiative is a particularly important institution because it takes
away the agenda-setting monopoly from the politicians and makes it
possible for the 'outs' to propose issues for democratic decisions includ-
ing those that the politicians would much prefer not to raise, such as
matters concerning their income, privileges and discretionary power.
That direct democracy is indeed effective for - at least partly - break-
ing the politicians' coalition against the voters can be shown in the case
of Switzerland. It should be noted that in representative democracies it is
much more difficult to detect when such a coalition exists, because the
citizens have much higher costs to express their deviating preferences.
They have to resort to either informal protest, which is difficult to organise
and to make politically relevant, or they have to wait until election time,
where they will all the same find it difficult to express specific demands on
substantive issues. In Switzerland, on the other hand, citizens may
regularly participate in political decisions via referenda at federal,
cantonal and communal level. Between 1848 and 1990, there were 146
obligatory referenda on constitutional issues, 102 optional referenda on
laws, 182 initiatives (which were instituted in 1891) alone at the federal
level, and many more at the other levels (for an account of the Swiss
referendum system see e.g. Hertig 1984; on Swiss institutions, see
Aubert 1974; de Rougemont 1965). Many decisions of the politicians,
which were clearly to their benefit, were turned into referenda by the
voters: (1) Proportional voting for parliament (the Nationalrat) which the
politicians rejected, was adopted by the citizens in 1918. In the
subsequent elections, the Radical-Democratic lost 40 per cent of their
seats. (2) A popular initiative undertaken in 1946 succeeded in making
'urgent' federal laws subject to an obligatory referendum within one year.
(3) A referendum on Switzerland joining the United Nations resulted in a
rejection by 76 per cent of the votes. In all these cases, the politicians in the
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government and parliament had formally decided the opposite. The
voters were, however, not prepared to decide in favour of the politicians'
cartel, but rather reduced its power.
Econometric cross-section studies for Switzerland (Pommerehne
1978, 1990) reveal that the political decisions with respect to publicly
supplied goods correspond the better to the voters' preferences, the more
extensively developed the institutions of direct political participation
are. As it is the individual taxpayers and not the politicians who have to
bear the cost of government activities, it is not surprising that in political
communities with particularly well-developed institutions of direct
democracy, public expenditures are ceteris paribus lower.
Referenda not only serve to break up the politicians' coalition by
destroying their monopoly of agenda setting, but they also focus the
political discussion on substantive issues. This is not the case if, as in
California, there are a large number of propositions put forth on a
particular day. In Switzerland, on the federal level, there are usually two
to three issues at a time. As a result, the citizens are offered information
free of charge.
Public Choice has overlooked another consequence of referenda
because this theory limits itself to decision aspects. Before a vote is
taken, the public discussion induced shapes the citizens' preferences in
the sense that the individuals are confronted with political issues they
have not considered before, and which they learn to evaluate according
to their constant basic preferences (see Stigler and Becker 1977). While
this discourse does not meet the strict conditions of an 'ideal' and 'non-
imposed' discussion among free people (Habermas 1983; Hoffe 1985),
referenda constitute the best practically feasible and institutionalised
form of interaction between citizens (Frey and Kirchgassner 1992).
The idea of referenda is often rejected especially by intellectuals,
because the citizens are said to be of insufficient intelligence and educa-
tion to grasp and reasonably decide upon political issues; this task must
be left to an elite. This is analogous to the intellectuals' animosity to the
market as discussed by Stigler (1984). For Switzerland, a political scien-
tist voices the widespread opinion among social scientists that a
referendum democracy 'reduces governmental efficiency of performance
and the capacity to innovate' (Hertig 1984, pp. 254-255; my transla-
tion). Such a charge is unacceptable if one takes individuals' preferences
as the normative base for evaluation, because it assumes that there exists
an independent 'social will' according to which a government's 'effi-
ciency' and 'innovation' is good as such. Following the individualistic
view, however, 'this type of technocratic activity can well be incompat-
ible with the citizens' preferences, in which case 'efficiency' and 'innova-
tion' are harmful rather than good. There is, of course, room for an elite
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220 Bruno S. Frey
also in a direct democracy, namely to work out the details and assess the
consequences of the various political issues at hand.
V. Conclusions
There is little point in confronting market efficiency with political ineffi-
ciency; what matters is the extent of competition in both the economic and
the political markets. At the constitutional level, it is important to ensure
that both areas are open to the entry and activities of factors of produc-
tion as well as ideas. In the political area, the institutions of federalism -
especially in the form of multiple, functional and overlapping govern-
mental units - and of direct democracy, serve well to enable citizens to
express their preferences and to break the coalition of politicians against
voters. In particular, the popular initiative introduces issues which in a
representative democracy tend to be suppressed by the agenda setting
monopoly of the politicians.
Referenda are rarely used in modern democracies; Switzerland is by
far leading in this respect. Of the roughly 500 referenda made at national
level between 1793 and 1978, 300 or 60 per cent were held in Switzer-
land. The second most intensive use occurs in Australia with just 40
referenda or 8 per cent (Butler and Ranney 1978). Moreover on most
rankings of per capita national income or of social indicators (see e.g.
Review of Economics and Statistics 1991 or 1992), Switzerland is placed
on top. In Eastern Europe, where the constitutions have to be developed
anew and where the politico-economic structures are not yet ossified (see
Olson 1982), federalism and referenda should be considered as a means
of invigourating political competition. The emerging European Com-
munity constitution relies on 'democratisation' via strengthening the
parliament and the Supreme Court. According to our analysis, these
political institutions are not well suited for enabling the citizens to
express their preferences, and they may even contribute further to the
cartel of the politicians against the voters.
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